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T HE problem of the local service carrier in the domestic air trans-
port system of the United States is one of the most troublesome
results of the new attitude toward subsidization. The impact on air
transportation of the nation's declining tolerance for subsidies to busi-
ness has led one editor to the opinion that "the promotional stage of
air transport in the U. S. has reached an end."' Certainly, the freedom
with which the Civil Aeronautics Board has promoted in the past, with
only minor obligations to explain and justify its actions to Congress,
will be limited. Until recently, the policy of the Boaird was to con-
sider the domestic industry in two parts; the trunk lines, whose pro-
gress as a group into self-sufficiency was a source of encouragement,
and even concern, as the possibility of excessive profits arose,2 and the
local service carriers, whose financial progress and prospects continued
discouraging and who ought, therefore, to be looked on as a secondary
air transport system requiring substantial and continuing subsidy
assistance.3 Now, however, the new attitude that the air transport
industry ought to be self-sufficient may force consideration of the two
parts as one industry only, with very great differences in earning
power among its members. Apropos, then, would be Charles Lamb's
1 American Aviation, August 17, 1953, p. 8.
2In the matter of The Gene,'al Passenger Fare Investigation, etc. Civil
Aeronautics Board Order Serial No. E-7376, decided May 14, 1953. "The Board
has considered the latest available earnings reported by the domestic trunkline
carriers, as well as those reported for recent years, and it believes that, looking
at these years alone, such earnings must be considered excessive when measured
by any reasonable standard applicable to a regulated industry." p. 5.
8 ". . . the trend since World War II has been in the direction of providing
service to marginal points through a secondary airline network which is clearly
not self-supporting. The support of this secondary system by the government
is based upon an amalgam of political and social considerations rather than on
economic justification." Paul W. Cherrington, "Objectives and Strategies for
Airline Pricing." 18 JRL. OF AIR LAW & COM. 254-5 (Summer, 1951).
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description, in his essay "Poor Relations," of that embarrasingly less
fortunate member of one's family as ". . . the most irrelevant thing in
nature . . . a preposterous shadow, lengthening in the noontide of
your prosperity . . .. a drain on your purse- a more intolerable dun
upon your pride .... a triumph to your enemy - an apology to your
friends." What shall be done with the poor relations of the air trans-
port industry?
This current problem of the impact of the decline of promotion on
that most promoted part of the domestic air transport system is, of
course, only an aspect of the larger problem of inequalities in the
earning power of a group of companies whose individual survival is
important to society. For, since poverty is relative, the relatively poor
shall be with us always. The combination of a) differences in cost
levels among the companies as a result of market- and route-structure
differences, and, b) the more or less uniform fare levels required as a
practical matter where the companies compete at a number of points,
give rise to large inequalities in earning power which are as difficult
to live with as to get rid of, as is demonstrated by the weak-and-strong-
carrier problem with which the Interstate Commerce Commission has
toiled for over 30 years.
This paper will be concerned with aspects of the general problem
of the earning power of our domestic air transport companies (in pub-
lic utility terminology, the general rate level and its control by regula-
tion) with special emphasis on the weak carrier as exemplified in the
local service carriers. It will assume no change in the basic policy of
public utility regulation of air transportation in the United States. 4
More than that, it will explore some possibilities for the more exten-
sive use in air transport regulation of regulatory devices well developed
in the older public utility industries. 5
INADEQUATE EARNING POWER AMONG AIR CARRIERS
It is appropriate, first, to review the answers to the questions:
where, in the domestic air transport industry, is weakness in earning
power to be found, and, what have been the causes of this weakness.
4 The view that we oue ht to abandon all economic regulation of air trans-
portation, or those parts of the present regulation which serve to protect the
revenues of the existing carriers, has mny strong points and many advocates.
See, for the most thorough analysis, Lucile Sheppard Keyes, "Federal Control
of Entry into Air Transportation," Harvard University Press. 1951. It is the
present author's opinion, however, that in view of the impossibility of predicting
the performance of the industry if it were free of puhlic utility regulation, our
present system, with modifications, offers greater public benefit.
5 The Civil Aeronautics Act is similar in all important respects to other
public utility regulatory statutes, either for transportation companies or the
"local" public utilities; it differs from most in its provisions for promotion of air
transport develonment with federal funds. (For a discussion of this point, see
Oswald Ryan, "Regulation of Air Transportation under Civil Aeronautics Act.
An analvsis of the similarities and dissimilarities of air carrier regulation as
compared with regulation of older forms of utility service." Public Utilities
Fortniehtly, Nov. 24, 1949, vol. 44, pp. 695-703.) As promotion declines, and as
the use of comnetition as a reulator is relied upon less and less (a possible trend
to be discussed later in this paper) the regulatory functions of the Board will
become increasingly important and the Board may come to resemble more and
more the other regulatory commissions in its actions.
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There is general agreement that inadequate earning power is to be
found among the smaller trunk lines, or small regional carriers, and
among the local service carriers. For these carriers, non-mail revenues
have failed to cover operating costs by the largest margins, year after
year, and there is no reason to expect a significant change in this situa-
tion. There is not, however, agreement as to the reason for these
inadequacies in earning power.
The Reasons for Inadequate Earning Power
The earning power of a company is, of course, the difference be-
tween its revenues and its expenses, related to the investment required
to produce the service. A firm under public utility regulation is, by
its relative freedom from competition, more or less in control of its
revenues as well as its expenses; the resulting monopoly profits are,
therefore, controlled by the regulative agency in the public interest.
Under conditions of competition, the unit revenue or market price is
given, and the firm's managers must meet it by control over costs or
go out of business.
The rise of competition between air carriers thus emphasizes the
importance of the unit cost level of the firm. It has been observed that
under the zonal- or regional-monopoly system of routes which the
Board inherited from the Post Office, a small company might achieve
self-sufficiency because, being free of heavy competitive pressures on
most of its system, it could control both its costs and its revenues.,
With the great increases in parallel competition since then, control
over revenue has largely disappeared as a carrier's fare-level was dic-
tated by others, and his share of a market often bore little relation to
his own efforts.7 And, holding one's own, costwise, has become in part
a function of the size of the firm.
"... .effective competition can exist only between carriers who are
so constituted that inherently they have comparable unit operat-
ing costs. Moreover, since the size and character of the markets
served by the carriers-a matter controlled by their route struc-
tures-have a primary influence on the unit costs which they can
attain, the Board ...had to keep ever in mind the necessity of
insuring to each carrier a system of sufficient size to take advantage
of the lower costs of volume operations." s
Although the precise significance of economies of large scale among
the medium- and large-sized air carriers is not clear, there is agreement
that, by any measures, the very small trunk-line carriers are uneconom-
6 Howard C. Westwood, "Choice of the Air Carrier for New Air Transport
Routes." The George Washington Law Review, Feb., 1948, vol. 16, p. 222.
7 See F. W. Gill and G. L. Bates, "Airline Competition." Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1949, pp. 616ff.
8 Civil Aeronautics Board, "The Role of Competition in Commercial Air
Transportation." Report to Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Senate Select
Committee on Small Business, Nov. 24, 1952, p. 6.
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ically small.9 The same conclusion must hold true for the local service
carriers, the largest of which is comparable in size to the smallest trunk
line. The large local service carriers have been experiencing unit cost
levels which are similar to those of the smaller trunk lines, and which
are the lowest of their local service group. 10
But is the size of the firm the critical point in an airline's ability
to achieve self-sufficiency? Suppose that to an airline which is not self-
sufficient at the present time were added additional markets identical
in character to the average market presently being served, so that the
average traffic generated per station, the average flight distance, and
the average passenger haul were unchanged. Would the airline then
be any closer to self-sufficiency? According to the analysis of Professor
Koontz, its cost level might decline significantly only if it were one of
the very small carriers. For those trunk-line carriers not among the
self-sufficient Big Four, the answer to self-sufficiency lay in improving
the revenue load factor by improving the size and density of the mar-
kets facing the carrier, that is, in large traffic-originating cities and in
heavy traffic-flow city-pairs.11 These conclusions would seem to apply
with even greater strength to the local service carriers, where the weak
markets result in inadequate revenue, and the small size of the firm
results in excessive unit costs.
COMPETITION AS A CAUSE OF CARRIER WEAKNESS
The creation of competition between air carriers by new route and
service certification of the Civil Aeronautics Board has been widely
discussed as a cause of inadequate earning power of the industry and
of particular carriers. The Board has been forced to defend itself before
different Congressional committees against the opposite charges that
it had created too much competition and that it has fostered too much
monopoly; a former member has recently observed that the Board has
had no policy and no administrative "expertise" with respect to the
amount of competition necessary to secure sound development of air
transportation, and that it has "... boxed the compass a dozen times
See Harold D. Koontz, "Economic and Managerial Factors Underlying
Subsidy Needs of Domestic Trunk Line Air Carriers," 18 JRL. OF AIR LAW &
CoM., 127-56, and "Domestic Air Line Self-Sufficiency: A Problem of Route
Structure," American Economic Review, vol. 42, pp. 103-25, March, 1952; espe-
cially the latter article at p. 109ff. The conclusions here are in agreement with
Gill and Bates, op. cit., p. 617, and with earlier studies of the relation between
firm size and operating cost levels. All of these studied have considered only the
domestic trunk-line carriers.
10 Civil Aeronautics Board, Recurrent Reports of Mileage and Traffc Data
and of Financial Data, 12 months ended March 31, 1953.
11 John P. Carter, in a critical note on Professor Koontz' analysis ("Domes-
tic Air Line Self-Sufficiency: Comment," American Economic Review, vol. 43,
pp. 368-73, June, 1953, to which Koontz made a rejoinder at pp. 373-77.) observed
that the success of some airlines might be the result of few small markets rather
than many large markets and that the inability of other airlines to achieve self-
sufficiency was due to their planes being too big and not to their markets being
too small. Although this discussion was limited to the trunk lines, Carter's re-
wording makes the conclusions particularly good descriptions of the problem of
the local service carrier.
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on the point."12 Certainly there has been much uncertainty, and
Board action could not be successfully predicted.1 3
Experimentation by the Board (or wavering) in the amount of
competition was perhaps inevitable under the somewhat conflicting
statutory requirements of "competition to the extent necessary" for
firms which were restricted in their entry to a particular market by
that device for creating legal monopolies in the public utility field -
the certificate of public convenience and necessity. The Board had to
steer some "in between" course in a situation like the mythological
Charybdis and Scylla. On the one hand lay the stern rocks and monster
of monopoly; on the other, the treacherous whirlpool of excessive
competition. If the course taken has shown wavering, and if it has
been dangerously on the edges of the whirlpool, the Board's seaman-
ship was only part of the explanation. The winds of optimism and the
currents of unjustifiable pressure on the Board have played their part,
too.
Regulation by Competition
In one respect, the growth in competition has special interest for
the argument here. The Act, in common with other utility statutes,
gives the Board, in Section 404 (a), control not only over the rates
charged, but also over the quality of service rendered by, an air car-
rier. Thus far in the administration of the Act there has been little
use of the power over service adequacy, except in the case of the local
service carriers where, for example, the requirement of a minimum
of two daily round trips over a route segment has been common. But
in the case of these carriers, competition has not been available as a
device to assure adequate service because the thin market would not
support a second carrier.
In general, the Board's attitude has been that competition would
achieve far more effective regulation of the quality of service than
would its own directives.1 ' There is much to be said for regulation by
competition, as the philosophy of the relation between government
and business in the United States attests. It is automatic and therefore
12 Harold A. Jones, "The Anomaly of the Civil Aeronautics Board in Ameri-
can Government," 20 JRL. OF AIR LAW & COM. 150 (Spring, 1953).
18 This, however, is no different from any attempt to predict Board action
in a certificate case by reasoning by analogy from earlier decisions, as Westwood,
op. cit., has detailed. Unfortunately, air traffic predictions, an important part of
the data underlying Board decisions on competition, have not had much greater
success. The optimism inherent in a new industry's early years is one thing;
the expectation of a continuation of early percentage rates of growth measured
from a small base is another thing, and unwarranted, of course, by arithmetic
alone. A child who, on its second birthday, shows any signs of gloating over a
100% increase in its age in one year ought to be reminded: a) that it can never
do it again, as long as it lives, and b) everyone else has done it before,-once.
This seems to have been forgotten in some predictions.
14 "The improvements which flow from a competitive service cannot be ob-
tained by administrative fiat. There is no regulation conceivable which could
assure courtesy by a carrier's employees, for example, and it would be extremely
difficult to attempt to dictate many other matters affecting the quality of the
service rendered." Colonial Airlines, Inc. et al., Atlantic Seaboard Operation,
4 C.A.B. 552, 555 (1944).
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it economizes in government coercion. But it is ruthless in its assump-
tion that the survival of any one firm is of no great social consequence.
Where the individual firm's survival is a matter of importance, as in
air transportation today, competition as a regulatory weapon must be
used with a light touch - lighter, very likely, than the Board was capa-
ble of in the environment of the post-war years. 15
It would seem that regulation by competition is an attitude more
in keeping with the promotional, than with the self-sufficiency, age of
air transportation. It makes a permanent alteration in the market
structure which, in the event of errors in estimating the competitive
impact, will have to be lived with, not covered over with additional
subsidy. The Board has recognized the limits to competition as a
substitute for its own regulation.'" The recognition that there is little
room for new parallel competition suggests that the Board, in the
future, will have to make greater use of its powers over adequacy of
service. 17
THE SPECIALIST DOCTRINE AND SELF-SUFFICIENCY
A decade ago the Board embarked upon its largest promotional
program: the planned development, on an experimental basis, of air
service in the small-city, short-haul market."i An essential part of the
experiment was the doctrine of the specialist, that is, that a new type
of service requires a new type of operator, one who will offer only some
of the services, or serve in only some of the geographic markets, which
the trunk-line carrier had been serving. The thinking behind the
doctrine is illustrated in the following quotation:
"The type of service we here visualize involves an entirely new
type of service gauged to meet the needs of smaller communities
and relatively short hauls. In view of the limited traffic potentiali-
ties of the points on the new system, an unusual effort will be re-
quired to develop the maximum traffic. Greater effort and the
exercise of managerial ingenuity may be expected from an inde-
pendent local operator whose continuation in the air transporta-
tion business will be dependent upon the successful development
15 A whip may be an effective way to increase the output of a horse, but the
horse must understand and he is being urged on to greater achievement, and not
beaten to death. Also, of course, the right horse must be whipped. In the 1949
Air Freight Case, where the Board thought the certification of cargo specialists
would provide a continuing spur of competition to the non-specialists. Member
Jones criticized the argument because the spur was applied most sharply to the
very carriers who needed it least. (p. 41 of the Jones dissent in Air Freight Case,
etc. Order Serial No. E-3085, decided July 29, 1949.)
16 To the contention of a feeder carrier that a trunk line's service had been
inadequate, the Board stated, "In the event the present service does not ade-
quately care for the needs of the interested cities, United could increase the number
of its schedules. If it fails to meet its duty in this respect, there are appropriate
measures provided by the Act. Certainly the remedy for inadequacy of service
does not lie in the creation of new routes where the traffic volume is insufficient
to support competition." Additional California-Nevada Service, Order Serial
No. E-2935, decided June 15, 1949, pp. 9-10.
17 The decision in Southern Service to the West Case, Order Serial No. E-5090
contains implications of this approach.
18 Invvestigatior of Local. Feeder, and Pick-Up Service, 6 C.A.B. 1 (1944).
AIRLINE SELF-SUFFICIENCY AND LOCAL SERVICE
of traffic on the routes and the operation of the service on an
adequate and an economic basis."'
This doctrine has been the justification for the selection of new com-
panies in preference to trunk-line applicants throughout the period of
the creation of the local service industry. The Board apparently has
not abandoned the doctrine, 20 and those carriers whose existence rests
on the doctrine naturally support it today.21
The specialist doctrine, however justifiable for an era of almost
unlimited promotion, is a highly questionable concept for an era when
self-sufficiency is the goal, for it seems to demand a high price for some
meager benefits. The purpose of the doctrine was to get the greatest
possible development in a market which was admittedly inadequate.
It seemed that the more of a specialist a firm was, the better a specialist
it would be. That fact, together with the clear need for minimizing
the competitive impact of the local service carrier on the trunk line,
has led the Board to impose many restrictions on the local service car-
riers which have had the avowed purpose of keeping them different.
For example, they must serve intermediate points whether the traffic
demands such service or not, for in the absence of such an obligation,
they would be little different from, and often directly competitive with,
the trunk lines. Or, the attempt of a local service carrier to equip its
fleet with a post-war, trunk-line-type, plane had to be disapproved
because among other reasons, such a step would eliminate a difference
between a local service carrier and a trunk line carrier and endanger
the local service experiment.2 2 Thus, a substantial part of the differ-
ence between the two types of carriers has been created. The local
service carriers have argued, quite correctly it seems, that these many
and various restrictions have hindered their progress to self-sufficiency;
they are thus put in the unhappy position of arguing that they deserve
to exist because they are different, but that they cannot continue to
exist unless they are made the same.
28
THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF THE LOCAL SERVICE CARRIER
The result of being created different and kept diffrent is that the
local service carrier shows a number of characteristics different from
the trunk line. It originates its passengers in smaller cities and hauls
them, on the average, shorter distances than the trunk-line carrier. It
19 Rocky Mountain States Air Service, 6 C.A.B. 695, 736-7 (1946). Italics
supplied.
20 See, Service to Fargo, North Dakota, Case, Order Serial No. E-7547, de-
cided July 10, 1953, p. 12.
21 See, for example, Leslie 0. Barnes, "The Case for the Local Service Air-
lines," 20 JRL. OF AIR LAW & COM. 199 (Spring, 1953). "There is a vast differ-
ence between a trunk line operation and a local service operation. Different
techniques are employed, different equipment is required-both in the air and on
the ground. The two types of operation do not mix in an operational sense, and
the concept is growing that an airline must specialize in either one or the other."
22 Pioneer Air Lines, Inc., Mail Rate, Order Serial No. E-7225, decided
March 13, 1953.
28 See, for example, the list of obstacles to feeder line progress in the state-
ment of Robert J. Smith, in "Separation of Air Mail Pay from Subsidy," Hear-
ings before the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, June-
July, 1951, pp. 449ff.
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operates two-engine pre-war equipment, not two- and four-engine
post-war planes. There are other, less striking, differences. But, are
these differences of the kind that make the services mutually exclusive
in a business sense? Are the differences of the sort which would char-
acterize a baker who also operates a dancing school, or of the sort
which characterizes a baker of bread who also bakes cakes, or who
operates a small grocery store in the front part of his bakery? Are the
two operations such, that if combined in one organization and per-
formed by the same persons, success in one would be wholly inde-
pendent of, or prejudicial to, success in the other? That, clearly, is
the question, and not the mere fact of differences in service or opera-
tion .24
Accepting the arguments above that the differences in the two
services are forced and insignificant, it is still possible that the local
service carriers have, by reason of their concentrated efforts, achieved
such significantly better results in generating traffic at small points
that they ought to be preserved despite their diseconomies. This is
a point which could be proven by an historical study of traffic genera-
tion at a homogeneous group of cities served exclusively by each type
of carrier.25 If the local service carriers have not been able to generate
a substantially larger amount of traffic than a trunk line develops in
the same type of small city, then one of their reasons for being is
destroyed.
There can be little doubt today about the absence of any economic
basis for local air service. The fears of the Board, when it first examined
the problem in 1943, concerning the thinness of the small-city, short-
haul market have since then been fully documented. Public trans-
portation in the United States is mass transportation, except for the
irregular contract taxi services. It is difficult to imagine technological
conditions in aviation which will make the boarding of one passenger
per flight, for flights over relatively short distances, economical in com-
parison with the more flexible forms of surface transportation, except
in a handful of isolated communities in the United States. The re-
24 In the record of the Air Freight Case where the freight specialist argu-
ment was accepted by the Board, Member Ryan has been quoted as follows: "The
refrigerators made by the General Motors Corporation, I imagine, are not any
less efficient refrigerators because the General Motors Corporation happens to be
engaged in the manufacture of automobiles.... There may be other rcasons why
you should be certificated but it seems to me that that kind of a reason is not
sound economics." Supra, p. 27 of the Jones dissent.
25 The author has attempted a comparison of traffic generating powers (from
the C.A.A.'s Enplaned Airline Traffic by Community, 1951) for all small com-
munities receiving service from a single carrier in 1951. Cities receiving service
for less than one year, and the five tourist cities with passenger indexes (number
of passengers enplaned per 1000 population) in excess of 1000 were excluded.
The repults do not suggest significantly better generative powers for the special-
ists. Thus, for 51 cities under 10,000 population served exclusively by a local
service carrier, the median passenger index was 215; for 25 cities of similar
size served exclusively by trunk lines, the median index was 121. The average
passengers per plane departure were 1.0 and 1.9, respectively. For all cities
under 25.000 population, local service carriers had a median passenger index of
111 for 106 cities and trunk carriers 117 for 65 cities. Other measures for this
larger group showed, respectively for local and trunk carriers; average passen-
gers per departure of 1.14 and 2.18, mail tons per 1000 population of 0.44 and 0.39,
and cargo (including express) tons per 1000 population of 0.33 and 0.56.
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sponse of residents of small communities to high quality air commuter
service with their trade centers, at a fraction of the full social cost of
such service, proves only that consumers still know a bargain when
they see one. When consumers have enjoyed a so-called public service,
it is commonplace that they do not happily forego it, even when it was
not supported by the public treasury as in the case of railroad service.
The problem then, is not the abandonment of air service at all points
which cannot now bear the full cost thereof. Since the justification
for such service rests on political and social considerations, the question
becomes how such service can be provided at minimum social cost.28
A POSSIBLE SOLUTION
The discussion thus far has attempted to show that certain policies
of the Board were more appropriate for the promotional stage of
domestic air transportation than for the self-sufficiency stage on which
we are now embarked. The use of direct competition as a device for
the regulation of rates and services can be relied upon less when the
federal funds for easing the temporary or permanent pains of com-
petitive excesses are strictly limited. Similarly, the specialist doctrine,
by which local service carriers have been made different and kept
different for the purpose of maximum concentration of effort on a
minimum-sized market, must be reappraised. And the revision or
abandonment of these policies must be carried out against the back-
ground of the broad problem of the entire industry - the financial
stability of every one of its members.
There are a number of steps which can be taken by the Board,
which follow somewhat different paths, but which all move in the
direction of industry-wide self-sufficiency. The decision to attempt to
correct disparities in the earning power of trunk-line carriers by a
policy of mergers of the weak with the strong has received wide sup-
port. It may be that a somewhat similar move with respect to the local
service carriers would likewise find acceptance, when the special prob-
lems involved have been explored and the special techniques required
have been worked out. The remainder of this paper will be devoted
to some of the questions which would arise if such a policy were
adopted.
The Johnson Proposal
In April, 1953, Senator Johnson suggested to the Board a possible
use for the profits of the larger trunk-line carriers, if the General
26 It is important to observe that a criticism of the local service experiment
and of the specialist doctrine does not imply a criticism of the local service indus-
try or of the individual firms of which it consists. The Board on many occasions
has commended individual firms, and the industry's record of innovation in the
technology of air transportation has been widely publicized. (See, for a discussion
of the many achievements, Josh Lee, "The Planned Promotion of Feeder Air
Transportation." 17 JRL. OF AIR LAW & CoM., 356-60.) Public recognition and
approval of the efforts of these firms means they have substantial good will and
going concern values; this fact argues against any solution to the local serviceproblem which would destroy these values.
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Passenger Investigation then underway showed such profits to be
excessive:
"Instead of looking toward a reduction in the rates of these large
carriers, it would be far more sensible for the Board to compel such
carriers to utilize these profits by assuming the operation obliga-
tions of the local-service lines and smaller trunk lines that now
require subsidy. The big railroads are compelled by the regulatory
bodies to operate branch line passenger service at a terrific loss.
Instead of reducing the rates of the strong air carriers, the strong
air carriers should be required to take the bitter with the sweet, as
have the railroads.
27
The phrase, "taking the bitter with the sweet" refers to a concept
better developed in the public utility regulation of other-than-trans-
port companies, where it is often referred to as "taking the lean with
the fat." Generally, the concept embraces two ideas, only one of which
has thus far had any use in air transport regulation. In the first place,
the phrase refers to the fact that, for a multi-product, multi-market
firm, there is no reason to expect uniform rates of profit for all the
firm's products or in all its markets. This idea has been expressed by
the Board as applying to air transportation when, in the Transcon-
tinental Coach-type Service Case, it said:
"Our national air transportation system must of necessity provide
service at cities showing varying degrees of attractiveness from a
traffic-generating standpoint and individual route segments must
include some points that are below the optimum in profitability.
These variations exist not only in the system as a whole, but in the
system of each individual carrier."28
And in the same decision, the Board referred to "... the traditional
public service obligation of serving communities which can only be
served at a loss."29 Such a reference to the public utility obligation
for air transportation would seem to refer to the abandonment of an
existing service simply on the showing that that service provides less
profit than other services, or incurs a loss. In the second meaning, the
concept may refer, in "local" utility regulation, to the way in which
the firm expands within the market area in which it "holds itself out
to serve." Thus, in the process of introducing service to new sections
of the territory (a territory which has been delineated by the firm's
actions in offering service as well as by the terms of franchises) the
27 Senator Edwin C. Johnson, "Utilizing Trunk-Line Profits to Support
Local Air Service," Letter to the Chairman of ihe Civil Aeronautics Board, re-
printed in 20 JRL. OF AIR LAW & COM. 203, 204. The analogy to main- and
branch-line railroad service is similar to an analogy used by Board Member
Young in the Southeastern States Case, 7 C.A.B. 863, 911-12 (1947) where he
advocated the broadening of the feeder experiment to include trunk line carriers.
There, he argued that in the electric industry, ". . . the regulatory agencies have
not assumed that the public interest would be served by licensing one power
company to serve consumers at distant points and another to serve those nearby,
thus segregating the high- and low-cost services." In air transportation, the
analogy means that ". . . the operating entities . . .should be so constituted as
to provide, to the fullest extent practicable, a balanced volume combination of
the low-cost, high-value services on the one hand and the high-cost, low value
services on the other."
28 Order Serial No. E-5840, decided Nov. 7, 1951, p. 7.
29 Ibid., p. 5.
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firm is not free to select areas solely according to the test of immediate
profitability.30 Since the certificates of convenience and necessity in
air transportation define the carrier's service obligation by reference
to points, and not areas, this second meaning of the phrase "taking
the lean with the fat" does not apply in our present regulation of air
transportation.8 ' However, since Senator Johnson was referring to the
expansion of trunk line operations into the "bitter" or the "lean," it
would seem that his proposal bears a relationship to this second mean-
ing.
No method was described for carrying out the proposal that the
large trunk lines assume the operation obligations of the weaker lines.
Conceivably, there could be gradual transfer of points presently served
by the local service carriers to the trunk lines carriers; such a policy
would be related to that of the Board in recent years when it has trans-
ferred feeder-type points from trunk line routes to local service routes
in an attempt to strengthen the latter. It would be possible to transfer
the poorer local service points from local service carriers to trunk lines,
thus improving the earnings of the former and at the same time utiliz-
ing the excess profits of the latter. But for such a policy to do substan-
tial good, it would probably have to be carried to such lengths that
the local service carriers would emerge as small regional trunk lines
with new duplicative route patterns, while the trunk lines would be
performing, in addition to their present services, those services now
being rendered by the local service industry.3 2
Preferable methods for implementing the Johnson proposal would
be the transfer of route segments or entire route systems, or the merg-
ers of the weaker companies into the strong. How might such actions
be taken, so that the losses on the federal investment in the promotion
of local air service would be minimized at the same time that the
greatest possible progress toward total industry self-sufficiency was
being made? One possible program which the Board might adopt is
sketched below, in very broad lines.
A MERGER PROGRAM FOR THE LOCAL SERVICE CARRIERS
Basic to the program for narrowing the disparities in earning power
would be the adoption of a merger program, by the statement that the
Board would view favorably certain kinds of mergers made under
30 For example, the following is a typical statement: "Corporations which
devote their property to a public use may not pick and choose, serving only the
portions of the territory covered by their franchises, which it is presently profit-
able for them to serve, and restricting the development of the remaining por-
tions .... People ex rel. New York & Queens Gas Co. v. McCall, 245 U.S. 345,
351 (1917).
51 In the Air Freight Case, supra, Slick and Flying Tiger requested certifi-
cates worded in terms of geographic areas rather than points. The Board, how-
ever, after stating it was not deciding whether the Act gave it the power to
award area certificates which omitted any mention of specific points, named
groups of specific noints. It appears that the difference in practice between the
two tvpes of certificates need not be great.
32 Such does not seem to have been Senator Johnson's intent, for he did not
state that the trunk lines should assume only some of the operating obligations
of the weaker carriers.
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specified assurances and restrictions.3 3 The mergers ought to be be-
tween a trunk line and one or more local service carriers with whom
that trunk line has some substantial service areas in common; perhaps
the trunk-line's choice should be limited to the local service carrier or
carriers with whom it competes in the largest number of (or most
important) city-pair markets. While the existing temporary certificate
for the local service route might be made permanent, the existing
minimum flight-frequency requirements should be retained for a
further experimental period, except insofar as their purpose was to
limit the competitive impact of the local carrier on the trunk line.
It might be expected that the mechanics of a merger would transfer
the fleet and much of the personnel of the local service carrier to an
operating department of the trunk line. However, the local system
should be retained as a separate rate-making unit for mail pay pur-
poses, with separate accounts and reporting requirements, as was used
in the transfer of a local route to Mid-Continent in 1950.34 Subsidy
would, of course, be required for an initial period, but the amount
could be expected to be reduced almost immediately for a number of
reasons; the economies available from the merging of duplicate plants
and operations, the economies from elimination of operating restric-
tions on the local service system intended to prevent excessive com-
petition with the trunk line, and increases in revenue from system
traffic growth and from the higher local service fare levels made possible
by the reduction of competitive city-pairs 5
After an initial period of operation with continued but substantially
reduced federal subsidy, and as excess earnings developed for the trunk
line, consideration should be given to the transition from externally-
supplied subsidy to internal or intra-firm subsidization. Perhaps for
an interim period, an earnings offset system would be desirable whereby
some portion of the excess earnings on the trunk line routes, when
there were such, would be used to offset the subsidy on the local service
route. Ultimately, the use of separate rate-making units should be
abandoned and the distinction between the two parts of the firm's
system would disappear in accounts and reporting.
It is perhaps worth noting again that under this proposal, the
restrictions hitherto imposed on the local service carriers, and which
were the cause of operating diseconomies, could in large part be re-
laxed. In addition, what has in effect become an obligation on the
local service carrier to operate with pre-war equipment would disap-
3 This discussion will exclude the smaller trunk lines who are also in the
category of weak carriers, and whose problems would not be solved by a merger
with a local service carrier but probably rather by a merger with a large trunk
line.
84 Parks Investigation Case, Order Serial No. E-4472, decided July 28, 1950.
85 Board action to maintain higher fare levels on local service routes is
indicated bv the following statement: "We shall also look with disfavor on any
action of Mid-Continent whereby it would attempt to equalize its fares for such
circuitous services with the fares for the direct services of the existing carriers,
or to resort to snv other device for providine competition which we do not intend
either to authorize or permit." Parks Investigation Case, supra, p. 24.
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pear.3 6 Some small cities would very likely receive service with newer
equipment. It is also possible that that most unfortunate obstacle in
the local service experiment, the lack of an economical local service
plane, would be overcome; certainly, the stronger resources and perma-
nent certificates of the trunk lines would lead the manufacturers to
examine again the market for the successor to the DC-3.
A NEw POLICY STATEMENT OF THE DIMENSIONS OF PROMOTION
An essential part of any program for the future development of
air transportation, and a second part of the program for reducing
disparities in earning power, would be a statement of policy by the
Board as to the direction of future growth. The decision of the Board
in dismissing The General Passenger Fare Investigation contains some
parts of that kind of a program. The Board's comments there on the
need for measuring profits over a long period, and of the desirability,
in the regulation of profits, of providing an economic climate con-
ducive to managerial risk-taking manifests a more advanced view of
regulatory responsibilities than many utility commissions are capable
of, and promises a strong future for the air transport industry.
In this decision, the Board recognized, and offered encouragement
to, one dimension of growth - the expansion of coach-type service -
in favor of growth in another dimension -a first-class passenger rate
reduction. Profits could be used in either direction: to reduce prices
of one service or to expand the scope of another type of service in those
markets where it has been considered marginal. Losses, of course,
might give rise to the opposite actions.
There are a number of other possible uses for profits (or losses)
a reduction (or increase) in all rates, the introduction of new equip-
ment (or the retardation of its introduction), the expansion (or con-
traction) in the intensive scope of service as by increased schedule
frequency, and the expansion (or contraction) in the extensive scope
of service as in the introduction of service to new cities or in new
city-pairs. It cannot be assumed that each of these methods of plowing
excess earnings back into the business would serve the nation's air
transport needs equally well in all instances, nor that they would be
equally useful ways of absorbing the excess earning power of any one
firm when that firm's principal competitors lack such earnings. There
is no assurance that, in the absence of the restraint of the Board's hand
or voice, a carrier might not choose to spend excessive earnings ex-
clusively on those competitive weapons for altering existing shares in
a market - overscheduling and equipment innovation, at greater pub-
lic cost than public gain. It would seem then that the Board will have
in the future the responsibility of indicating desirable directions of
growth and rates of growtho just as it has done in its recent encourage-
ment of coach service. Under a regime where the service to the
marginal small-city, short-haul markets in a region is the exclusive
36 See Pioneer Air Lines, Inc., Mail Rate, supra.
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responsibility of one unsubsidized firm with only a limited incentive
to expand into more of the same thinness, the Board must, it seems,
announce a doctrine of "taking the lean with the fat" -that in ex-
change for control over this market, the firm has some responsibilities
for developing it.
It may be that this type of program would satisfy the many con-
flicting interests involved in the local service problem. It provides for
a continuation of local air service at its present extensive and intensive
level, and attempts to assure the future expansion of such service at
an economic rate."7 The communities involved can have no objections
if such aims are achieved, and the issue is thus kept out of the political
arena where local interests often emerge above the national interest.
The national transportation policy of Congress will be furthered and
the Administration's aim of economy will also be served. The trunk-
line carriers know that their status as a regulated industry gives them
certain protections and also imposes upon them certain responsibilities.
From the past record, there is no reason to expect trunk-line manage-
ments to argue: a) their legal right to more than a reasonable return
on the investment plus limited rewards for managerial efficiency and
incentives for future risk-taking, or, b) their freedom from responsi-
bility for the development of a great national asset and a highly essen-
tial service. 38
Air transport in the United States has arrived at the point of tran-
sition from heavily promoted childhood, under the logic of support
for an "infant industry," to self-sufficient maturity. It may be that the
present form of the Act poses some obstacles to the transition; if so,
alteration is certainly possible in the present environment. More im-
portant, it would seem, is a recognition by the regulators and the
industry of the new meaning of promotion for a self-sufficient industry
- the creation of an environment conducive to the largest balanced
growth which is economically justifiable to the investors whose con-
fident support is essential.
87 It has recently been argued (Leslie 0. Barnes, op. cit. pp. 198-99) that the
proposal that trunk-line carriers be required to provide local air services "makes
absolutely no sense for a number of unassailable reasons." The reasons offered
are: 1) that the trunk lines could render identical service to that now being
offered by local service carriers only at greatly increased costs and larger sub-
sidy. Such an assertion, without proof or even indication as to why a result
would occur which is contrary to all that might be expected, cannot be dealt
with; 2) that the trunk lines have offered only "token service" to small cities
and can neither be expected to change or forced to change by the Board. A com-
parison between the two types of carriers is meaningless here, for a few small
cities on a long route do not make a local route pattern. In this instance, a
synonymous phrase for "token service" may be "economically justifiable service."
And the Board would not agree to the suggestion of its impotence, as shown
above; 3) the statement quoted above in note 21, that the local service operation
is distinctly different and hence requires a specialist, an assertion that has
already been discussed.
58 Air transport lies in that group of businesses to which resort to national-
ization has been easily and frequently made. In this connection, Sir Leonard
Isitt in "Air Transport in New Zealand and the South Pacific," Journal of the
Royal Aeronautical Society, Nov., 1951, observes that a case for nationalization
can be made on five grounds, of which two are, ". . . cut-throat competition is
eliminated . . ." and ". . . it becomes more practicable to use profits on main lines
to absorb losses on lateral routes." p. 709.
